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SHACKLE ON CHOICE, IMAGINATION AND CREATIVITY: HAYEKIAN FOUNDATIONS 
 
Pre-print version. Later version subsequently accepted at the Cambridge Journal of Economics 
  
 
Abstract 
This paper develops a response to some of the criticisms that have been made of G.L.S. Shackle’s 
analysis of human decision-making because of its reliance on a Cartesian account of the mind. It is argued 
that the basis for a response can be found in the work on theoretical psychology developed by Shackle’s 
fellow-subjectivist, and one-time PhD supervisor, F.A. Hayek. In particular, the ideas advanced by Hayek 
in his 1952 book, The Sensory Order can be used to provide an account of the mind that avoids the 
shortcomings of Shackle’s Cartesianism whilst still doing justice to Shackle’s emphasis on genuine 
choice, on expectations, and on the role of creativity and the imagination in human decision-making. 
 
JEL classifications: B2, B3, B4, B5 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper seeks to develop some aspects of the work of one of the most insightful heterodox economists 
of the twentieth century, namely G.L.S. Shackle. It does so by drawing on ideas from theoretical 
psychology and cognitive science in order to elaborate on Shackle’s ideas about the nature and 
significance of creative decision-making. In doing so, it suggests how to it is possible to respond to some 
criticisms that have been made of Shackle’s ideas, whilst retaining his emphasis on the importance of 
creative choice and the imagination in human decision-making. 
One of the defining characteristics of Shackle’s work is his commitment to the principle of 
subjectivism, that is, to the idea that what matters for understanding the behaviour of economic actors is 
not their objective circumstances per se but rather how they understand those circumstances. For Shackle, 
economics is fundamentally about meaning (that is, about how people interpret the situation in which they 
find themselves and how that interpretation leads them to act): 
 
‘Economics, concerned with thoughts and only secondarily with things, the objects of those 
thoughts, must be as protean as thought itself ... Economics is thought endeavouring to 
understand a world of action based on thought’ (Shackle [1972] 1992: 246, xii). 
 
Far from viewing human action as a simply a mechanistic response to external circumstances—a 
perspective that according to Shackle fails to do justice to the nature of genuine choice—Shackle 
contends that people’s decisions are the end product of a creative process that can generate a variety of 
interpretations of, and therefore responses to, a given set of external circumstances. Consider, for 
example, a group of businessmen who find that the price of one of the raw materials used in the 
production of the good sold by their firms has increased. The price rise is an indication that the raw 
material in question is scarcer than it has been in the past (Hayek 1945). But divining the precise 
significance of the ‘signal’ provided by the change in price still requires significant interpretive work on 
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the part of the businessmen, who in deciding how to respond must consider such issues as: whether the 
price change is likely to be temporary or permanent; whether it indicates that they should simply reduce 
the level of output they produce or invest in new machinery that enables them to sustain previous levels of 
output whilst using less of the raw material in question; the extent to which there is scope for them to pass 
the costs of the price rise on to consumers; and so on. The subjectivism of decision-making manifests 
itself in the varied ways in which different businessmen in the industry interpret and respond to the 
information about the increased scarcity of the raw material provided by the rise in its price. 
 While interesting and insightful, Shackle’s approach—summarised in Section 2.1 below—is 
vulnerable to criticism for a number of reasons. In particular, in arguing that genuine choice an ‘uncaused 
cause’ of new trains of action (1988: 2), Shackle adopts a Cartesian approach that renders the relation 
between the mental and the physical worlds unintelligible in a number of ways (Section 2.2). However, 
the intellectual resources required to resolve the problems with Shackle’s account can be found in an 
insightful tract in theoretical psychology, The Sensory Order, written by another prominent subjectivist 
economist, Friedrich Hayek (1952). The relevant aspects of Hayek’s account of the working of the mind 
are outlined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, before being used to suggest how the problems posed by Shackle’s 
Cartesianism can be resolved (Section 3.3). Hayek’s insights can also be used to underwrite and develop 
various other prominent aspects of Shackle’s account of the nature of creative choice, including the 
formation of expectations (Section 4.1), the nature of creativity (Section 4.2), and the way in which 
people’s choices are also sensitive to, and channelled by, constraints imposed by the nature of the social 
and material world (Section 4.3). Section 5 summarises and draws conclusions. 
 
 
2. SHACKLE ON THE NATURE OF CHOICE; EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE 
 
2.1 Shackle’s account of choice 
Shackle’s central goal is to ‘show the essential nature of choice’ (p. vii; also see p. 4). He argues that 
‘choice’, if the term is not to be emptied of all meaning, must have two key attributes. 
The first is that genuine choice involves people pursuing a course of action that is more than just a 
mechanical response to their current situation. For Shackle (1979: 55), ‘choices’ that are uniquely 
determined by antecedent circumstances are illusory. Genuine choice, on his view, requires that people 
are imaginative beings who in any given situation are able to envisage goals, and ways of proceeding 
towards those goals, that are new in the sense that they are not implied by, or implicit in, their prior 
circumstances. On this view, choice is an ‘uncaused cause ... the locus of ex nihilo imagination, the 
genesis of a taking place not wholly implicit in antecedents’ (1979: viii; also see pp. 48-53). Put slightly 
differently, choice requires that society be an open system, in the sense that if in any given circumstances 
x a person chose to take action y, then (s)he could equally have chosen to undertake some other course of 
action not-y (1979: 7-9, 12, 18-19, 33).  
Second, these originative choices have the capacity to change the set of events that take place in the 
world.
1
 As Shackle writes, choice ‘can shift the bounds of the range of rival possible sequels [of action] 
which the chooser can envisage, the skein of imagined sequels which are not blocked by some discernible 
obstacle’ (p. viii; also see pp. 3, 6): 
 
                                                          
1
 ‘To cause is to make a difference’ (Shackle 1979: 49). 
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‘[C]hoice will remove what would have been discernible obstacles from some evolutions of 
affairs, some paths of history … for example by allocating means and operations essential to 
those courses of events, the absence of which would have blocked them. [In this way,] 
[c]hoice makes seemingly possible some imagined histories-to-come’ (1979: 15). 
 
It is the scope for people’s choice to make a difference to the course of events in the world that motivates 
them to deliberate and, ultimately, to choose what to do (Shackle 1979: vii). 
Shackle contends that, taken together, these two attributes of genuine human choice—its 
indeterminate character and its ability to make a difference to the future course of events—have an 
important implication, namely that the social world is characterised by radical uncertainty. The latter 
entails that, when people are deciding how to behave, it is impossible for them meaningfully to assign 
numerical probabilities to the various outcomes to which their actions might lead, so that their decisions 
cannot be assimilated to the calculus of probability and the language of mathematical expectation. The 
reason is as follows.  
In an interdependent social world, the consequences of one person’s actions inevitably depend on the 
conduct of other people: ‘[T]he sequel of any present choice of action which [a person] makes,’ Shackle 
(1979: 9, 27) writes, ‘will be partly shaped by choices made, by others or himself, in time-to-come’ so 
that the future ‘waits to be created, to be originated, by choices to be made, now and in time-to-come, by 
himself and others.’ But if the future is the result of the (interplay between) the creative actions of a 
myriad of people, whose actions are not determined by their current circumstances, and if (as Shackle 
believes) those originative actions are unique events taking place in never-to-be-repeated circumstances 
(rather than repeated trials made under stable conditions), then people may be incapable of conceiving all 
the possible events that shape the outcomes to which their actions lead. The occurrence of such ‘unknown 
unknowns’ or ‘black swans’, as they are popularly known, is, therefore, a genuine surprise in the sense 
that it lies outside the confines of what people had hitherto imagined might happen (Taleb 2008; Runde 
2009: 498-01). And where the consequences of people’s decisions are determined by events that do not 
even register as possibilities for the decision-makers in question, then the evidential basis for the 
calculation of meaningful probabilities will be lacking (Shackle 1979: 52-60, 80-84): 
 
If choice is to be deemed capable of making a difference, if choice is to be deemed effective 
and originative, it follows that what will be chosen, is essentially, ineluctably 
unforeknowable. If by choosing we can originate history, then others in times-to-come can 
also give to the course of things impulses know unforeknowable which will affect the sequel 
of the choice we now make … [A] world of effective choice … is a world of essential 
unknowledge. (Shackle 1979: 145, 84) 
 
About such matters, as Keynes famously put it, ‘there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability. We simply do not know’ (1937: 214).2 
                                                          
2
 Put more formally, the problem to which creative decision-making gives rise is that the state space—that is, the set of states of the world that 
determine the consequences to which a decision-maker’s actions lead—is incomplete. The novel outcomes produced by creative decision-
making, such as the development of new technologies or products, violate one of the key presuppositions of the theory of rational choice under 
uncertainty, namely the assumption that people possess from the outset a comprehensive list of all the various possible states of the world that are 
relevant to their decisions. This assumption, which is variously known as the ‘small-world’ or ‘grand state space’ assumption, rules out the 
possibility of new, previously unimagined events. In doing so, it helps to ensure that the rational actor faces a well-defined decision-problem in 
which sharp, numerical probabilities can be attached to the consequences of the courses of action open to them. However, originative decision-
making, and the genuine novelty it introduces into the economic process, makes it impossible for people to specify in advance all the possible 
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Shackle argues that people cope with their ignorance or ‘unknowledge’ of the future, and so manage 
to act in a purposeful way, by using their (subjective) imaginations to envisage desirable future scenarios 
and then deciding which actions might bring them about: 
 
Economic choice does not consist in comparing the items in a list, known to be complete, of 
given fully specified rival and certainly attainable results. It consists in first creating, by 
conjecture and reasoned imagination on the basis of mere suggestion offered by visible or 
recorded circumstance, the things on which hope can be fixed. These things, at the time 
when they are available for choice, are thoughts and even figments. (Shackle [1972] 1992: 
96.) 
 
For Shackle, then, people act in the face of radical uncertainty by choosing between various conceptions 
or images of the future that they themselves have developed through the exercise of their creative 
imaginations. ‘Choice is necessarily made amongst works of thought, of imagination,’ Shackle writes  
(1979: 2).
3
 And having settled on a particular vision as to one to pursue, people then act in such a way as 
to remove perceived obstacles to its being realised and/or put in place requirements for it to be achieved 
(Shackle 1979: 2, 7, 11-12). 
For Shackle, the cognitive process through which people reach a decision about how to respond 
to (changes in) their circumstances involves them classifying external events by reference to their 
(dis)similarity to the various kinds of events and situations experienced in the past. Shackle highlights 
three main aspects of this process. 
First, people receive sensory impressions, generated by events or ‘takings-place’ in the external 
world (the Field, as Shackle terms it). These ‘reports from [the] field’, as Shackle terms them, are the way 
people gain news about that is going on in the external world (1979: 2-3, 23). 
 Second, people draw upon a repertoire of shared concepts in describing their beliefs about the 
working of the natural and social worlds—the Scheme, in Shackle’s lexicon—in order to sort and classify 
the raw sense data, thereby producing useful information or News. ‘The first act of any kind of 
understanding,’ Shackle (1979: 121) writes, ‘is to classify. To describe a thing or an event is to place it in 
a class pre-existing by general public convention.’ The vehicle for this classificatory process, the medium 
in which it takes place, is language. For in learning how to use the symbols associated with a particular 
language—in learning, for example, what counts as a ‘musical instrument’ or a ‘fridge’—people acquire a 
framework for conceptualising the world around them. ‘[L]anguage is the outward shape of thought,’ 
Shackle ([1972] 1992: 185) maintains, ‘the form which is inseparable from the content.’ Significantly, in 
addition to specifying what it is count as a particular kind of event or situation, the linguistic conventions 
or rules that govern the process of classification also indicate how one ought to respond to such 
circumstances. As Shackle puts it, the categories provide ‘instruction[s] for practice’ (1972: 51). 
Therefore, having assimilated an event or state of affairs to one of the pre-existing categories—for 
example by classifying a rise in the price of a raw material price as being akin to one that in the past 
proved to be only temporary—the decision-maker will be able to draw on the recipe of responses 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
states of the world in which they might be called upon to act, and which might shape the consequences of their actions. The upshot is that ‘in 
many decision problems under uncertainty states of the world are neither naturally given nor simply formulated … often even a comprehensive 
list of all possible outcomes is not readily available or easily imagined’ (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1995: 606; also see Feduzi and Runde 2014: 11-
12). 
3
 For more on this, see Runde (2000) and Zappia (2014: 1136-39). 
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associated with that kind of situation in order to decide how to respond (e.g. by choosing to hunker down, 
absorb the higher raw materials costs for a while, and wait for the price to fall once again).  
Third, and relatedly, while Shackle views people as imaginative beings who are able create the 
images of the future they choose to pursue, their imagination does not have completely free reign. On the 
contrary, it ‘must observe constraints … [In particular, it] is required to conform to Nature and human 
nature’ (1979: 8, 13). The constraints in question are imposed by the nature of the Field—that is, by the 
nature of the external social and material world—and only those goals whose realisation is (thought to be) 
consistent with such constraints are worthy of serious consideration: ‘Imagined filling of time-to-come 
must, in order to serve its purpose, be deemed possible … Choice is amongst skeins of possibilities, the 
Imagined, deemed Possible’ (Shackle 1979: 8, 79). 
One question to which this account of decision-making gives rise concerns whether people’s 
reliance on inherited (given) recipes or instructions for action leaves scope for novel responses associated 
with entrepreneurial creativity, whereby people use their creative powers of their imagination to devise 
new ways of dealing with familiar kinds of situation (e.g. by introducing new products and production 
techniques). In Shackle’s own words: 
 
Is it not then a fundamental problem for us, enquirers into choice, to explain how history-to-
come can be imagined by the chooser, originated in diverse mutually rival forms, yet be 
concerned with, and therefore composed of, entities in some sense given? ... What will 
reconcile these two ostensible incompatibles? (Shackle 1979: 15-16.)  
 
The answer, for Shackle, lies in the flexibility and generative potential of the language that expresses our 
thoughts: 
 
A language can express a limitless ... variety of thoughts but it composed of symbols of 
somewhat stable and suggestive content. The source of the suggestions, which resides in a 
word or sentence, is somewhat determinate and given by convention. The suggestions which 
it might inspire are by contrast unbounded in character and number ... The endeavour to use 
some term in the service of an idea which has, at least for its proposer, something of its own 
invention, some glint of original conception and novelty, necessarily throws upon this term a 
light from an angle unfamiliar to other users. The term is obliged to share to some degree the 
novelty which it seeks to address. It has to express that somewhat novel meaning, or 
construction of ideas, by suggestion, it has, if it is to succeed in its task, to induce in the 
hearer’s or reader’ thought a leap of intuition imitating that of the proposer of the supposedly 
original thought. Thus the bundle of meanings of this term is added to, its effect as a whole is 
somewhat changed, enlarged, or changed with a force that is new to it. (Shackle 1979: 122, 
136). 
 
For Shackle, then, people are able to act in a purposeful, creative, goal-driven fashion even in the face of 
radical uncertainty through the disciplined exercise of their imagination to create an image of the future 
which they then attempt to realise through their actions. 
 
2.2 Criticisms of Shackle’s account 
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At least three sets of problems arise with Shackle’s account of choice. As we shall see later in the paper, 
all three can be dealt with by invoking Hayek’s theoretical psychology as a cognitive scientific foundation 
for what Shackle has to say 
First, in suggesting that people receive simple sense impressions from the field, which they then 
interpret to form the ‘News’, Shackle’s approach is inconsistent with the evidence provided by 
phenomenologists and gestalt psychologists. For the latter indicate that, rather than experiencing basic 
sensations, which they then interpret in order to form images of the world, people simply experience a 
pre-interpreted world, seeing ‘a chair; or ‘a shop’.  
A second set of problems with Shackle’s approach stems from the way in which he draws a sharp 
distinction between the person or ‘thinking being’ (res cogitans), on the one hand, and the Field or 
external world (res extensa) on the other (1979: 3, 21, 93) (Hodgson 2000: 57-58). In doing so, Shackle 
adopts a form of Cartesian dualism, whose starkest and—for our present purposes—most significant 
manifestation is Shackle’s belief that genuine choice an ‘uncaused cause’ of new trains of action. As 
several commentators have noted, this kind of dualism is problematic, because it renders the relation 
between the mental and the physical worlds unintelligible in a number of ways. First, it does not address, 
let alone answer, the question of how the non-material causality involved in people’s mental lives is 
translated into the material causality of their physical lives (as for example when a person decides to 
move his hand and then actually does so). Second, such an approach struggles to explain what happens 
when the two types of cause work against one another. Third, by suggesting that non-material, uncaused 
actions of the mind can cause movements in physical matter, and thereby create energy, dualism appears 
to violate the law of the conservation of energy. Fourth, it also fails to do justice to evidence concerning 
the biological and, ultimately, the micro-physical causes of mental disorders (Bunge 1980: 2-5, 16-21; 
Hodgson 2000: 55-60; Searle 1997: xii-xiii; de Vries 1994: 315-16).  
A third shortcoming with Shackle account of choice is that while the analogy between creative 
choice and creative use of language is highly suggestive, Shackle does not develop the analogy between 
linguistic and entrepreneurial creativity in order to advance a convincing account of the latter. 
Consequently, he leaves unanswered certain key questions. For example, how precisely are novel 
meanings generated from individual terms whose meaning is well established? And what is the 
significance of such linguistic novelty for creative choice in the economic realm?  
In what follows, we aim to use Hayek’s theoretical psychology to place Shackle’s account of 
choice on firmer psychological foundations. To that end, we turn in the next section of the paper to 
Hayek’s account of the working of the mind, as presented in his book The Sensory Order (Hayek 1952). 
 
 
3. HAYEK THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SENSORY ORDER 
 
3.1 Hayek’s theoretical psychology: an outline 
We consider first whether the Shacklean account of emergence outlined above resonates with Hayek’s 
analysis of human cognition, as presented in his 1952 book The Sensory Order (Hayek 1952).  The task 
Hayek sets himself in that work is to explain why the phenomenal (subjective, mental) picture of the 
world provided by our senses differs from the physical order revealed to us by the natural sciences. The 
starting point for Hayek’s analysis is the fact that objects that appear to be altogether different to us may 
exhibit very similar physical properties, while objects that closely resemble each other in sensory terms 
may display very different physical relations to one other. The task of theoretical psychology, for Hayek, 
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is to show how the human central nervous system constitutes a classificatory structure that is capable of 
discriminating between different physical stimuli so as to give rise to the sensory order that we actually 
experience (Hayek 1952: 2-8, 13-19, 37-40, 47). 
For Hayek, the human central nervous system consists of a hierarchical network or structure of 
interconnected nerve fibres or neurons. When an external event stimulates a sensory receptor, an electrical 
impulse passes along a nerve fibre running from that receptor. If the stimulus is sufficiently strong, then 
that neuron will generate outgoing impulses that can in turn excite other neurons with which the first is 
connected, causing them to ‘fire’. In this way, an ongoing sequence of neural impulses is generated that 
culminates in the initial stimulus being transmitted to the brain. Neurons in which impulses often occur 
together tend to become connected to each other, so that over time the nervous system acquires a 
structure, in which the position of any one neuron is defined by its connections to other nerve fibres. 
The fact that neurons assume a particular structure is important for the following reason. If a 
person is to recognise a sensation as an instance of a particular type of sensory quality, it must be 
differentiated from other types of sensation. Individual nerve impulses are physically identical to one 
another, so the existence of the different sensory qualities cannot be the result of differences in the 
attributes of individual impulses (Hayek 1952: 10, 56). Rather, Hayek argues that the existence of the 
sensory order is best explained by reference to the relationships between those impulses, relationships that 
ultimately arise because the impulses in question are carried by neurons that occupy specific positions 
within the structure of the nervous system. Hayek’s theory of the mind is relational, therefore, in the sense 
that it is the structure of the connections between nerve fibres that governs people’s cognitive processes 
and which accounts for the key features of our mental experience (Hayek 1952: 12). 
To see why, note that the (primary) nerve impulse generated by a particular external stimulus will 
in turn stimulate neurons connected to those along which that primary impulse is transmitted. In this way, 
the external stimulus leads to the generation within the central nervous system of an induced pattern of 
(secondary) nerve impulses, characteristic not only of the external stimulus currently being experienced 
but also of the other external stimuli that have typically accompanied it in the past. This train or wake of 
(secondary) impulses is termed by Hayek the following of the initial nerve impulse (Hayek 1952b: 63). 
And, according to Hayek, it is by classifying external physical events according to the extended pattern of 
nerve firings or followings they trigger that the central nervous system distinguishes them from one 
another and thereby creates distinct sensory data. Two external events are classified as the same—and so 
are experienced as having the same sensory qualities—if they stimulate the same configuration of neurons 
and so trigger an identical following. Events that excite different groups of neurons, and so generate 
different followings, are placed in different categories and therefore produce different sensations (Hayek 
1952b: 48-54, 62-78). On this view, it is not the similarity of external events per se that causes them to be 
placed in the same class, and hence to be experienced in the same way, but rather the fact that, when they 
stimulate a receptor organ, they produce the same extended pattern or following of nerve impulses within 
the central nervous system.  
Herein lies the essence of Hayek’s attempt to complete the explanatory task he set himself in the 
Sensory Order, namely that of showing how it is possible that ‘from the known physiological elements 
[of the nervous system] a structure can be formed which can differentiate between different impulses 
passing through it in exactly the same manner in which our sensory experience differentiates between the 
different stimuli’ (Hayek 1952: 18; also see p. 47). For Hayek, external events stimulate the growth of an 
organised structure of nerve fibres that reproduces, albeit imperfectly, the patterns of events found in the 
external environment, in the sense that the structure of connections between the neurons corresponds 
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topologically to the structure of the relations between some of the external stimuli that impinge upon the 
person in question. And by reproducing at least some of the regularities obtaining between external 
events, the structure of neural connections or neural order that arises within the brain provides an 
approximate, and evolving, ‘map’ of the external, physical order (Hayek 1952: 7, 42, 64, 68-69, 107-112, 
198). In this way, according to Hayek, it is the set of connections between neurons that creates the 
classification of external stimuli that gives rise to the sensory or phenomenal order. Indeed, on Hayek’s 
account, the neural order—that is, the set of connections between nerve fibres in the brain, and the 
impulses proceeding in them—that is produced in this way just is the sensory order of phenomenal 
experience (Hayek 1952b: 40). Ultimately, the chain of impulses initiated by an external stimulus leads—
via a non-mechanical, neurophysiological process whose ultimate outcome depends not only on that 
stimulus but also on the set of impulses that was already coursing through the person’s nervous system 
when the stimulus in question was received—to the triggering of various dispositions or propensities to 
act in particular kinds of ways in certain types of situation (Hayek 1952b: 79-96, 112-27, [1964] 1967: 
57, [1969] 1978: 38-42, 1982: 289-90). 
It is significant for our present purposes that, on this view, people do not have simple sensory 
experiences which they then interpret and aggregate into the objects we actually, experience. On the 
contrary, according on Hayek, external stimuli are classified by the mind in such a way that people 
experience a pre-interpreted world, simply seeing – say – a chair or a sheep from the outset. As Hayek put 
it, ‘Every sensation, even the “purest”, must ... be regarded as an interpretation of an event in the light of 
the past experience of the individual or the species’ (1952: 166). It is for this reason, of course, that Hayek 
entitled one of his essays, ‘The Primacy of the Abstract’ ([1968] 1978). His point is that, because 
observation depends upon the rule-governed, classificatory activity of their minds, the richness of the 
sensory world ‘is not the starting point from which the mind derives abstraction, but the product of a great 
range of abstractions which the mind must possess in order to be capable of experiencing that richness of 
the particular’ ([1968] 1978: 43). Abstract categories and classificatory rules come first, concrete 
observations only later. 
It will also turn out to be significant for dealing with some of the other problems posed by 
Shackle’s account of choice, as we do in Section 3.3 below, that Hayek conceptualizes the mind as 
relational in nature. The capacity to discriminate between stimuli, and in that way to classify them and to 
generate the sensory order, is a property that is possessed, not by the individual neurons taken in isolation, 
but only by the structured entity that is formed when the nerve fibres are arranged as an ordered hierarchy 
(Hayek 1952: 35, 46-47). In Hayek’s theory, then, it is the structure of the connections between nerve 
fibres that governs people’s cognitive processes and accounts for the key features of our sensory 
experiences. As Hayek puts it, ‘The connections between the psychological elements are thus the primary 
phenomenon which creates the mental phenomena ... the whole set of [the sensory qualities evoked by a 
particular external event] is determined by the system of connections by which the impulses [produced by 
that stimulus] can be transmitted from neuron to neuron ...it is thus the position of the individual impulse 
or group of impulses in the whole system of such connections which gives them its distinctive quality’ 
(Hayek 1952b: 53, emphasis added; also see pp. 12, 147) (cf. Archer 1982: 475).  
 
3.2 Hayek’s theory of the mind and emergent properties 
It will be useful for understanding how Hayek’s theoretical psychology can help to overcome some of the 
difficulties with Shackle’s account of choice to bring out explicitly one important aspect of Hayek’s 
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analysis of the mind, namely its reliance on the notions of emergence and emergent properties (Lewis 
2012). 
If the brain is a structured arrangement of neurons, then its ability to give rise to the sensory 
order, to generate expectations, and to formulate and act on plans, is an emergent causal power of the 
structured array of neurons that is the human mind. The term emergence denotes the way that, when 
certain elements or parts stand in particular relations to one another, the whole that is formed has 
properties that are not possessed by its constituent elements taken in isolation. The properties that arise 
when the elements are arranged in the requisite way are known as emergent properties, while any whole 
that possesses an emergent property is known as an emergent or ‘higher-level’ entity. Emergent properties 
are structural or relational in the sense that their existence depends not only on the presence of their 
(‘lower-level’) constituent parts but also on those parts being organised or arranged into a particular 
structure that involves them standing in specific relations to one another (Bertalanffy 1971: 54; Elder-
Vass 2007a: 28; Lawson 2012a: 348-49).  
The notion of emergence suggests that reality is stratified in the sense that there is a hierarchical 
structure of ontologically distinct ‘levels’, each of which has its own distinctive properties including 
causal powers). These levels include the physical, the chemical, the biological, and—significantly, as we 
shall see below—the mental, as well as the individual and the social. The existence of entities in the 
higher strata always depends upon their constituent and lower-level components, but at the higher levels 
there are emergent properties that arise only as a result of the relations that obtain between lower-level 
entities and which are ontologically, causally and explanatorily irreducible to the properties of those 
lower-level entities taken in isolation. While it may be possible to explain the existence of the emergent 
properties, in the sense that one can give an account of how the properties or causal powers of an 
emergent entity like water result from the properties of its parts and the interaction that takes place 
between them when they are arranged the specified way, that is not the same thing as an ontological or 
causal reduction in which the emergent entity itself is shown to consist of nothing more than its lower 
level elements so that, in particular, its causal powers are reducible to the causal powers of those elements 
taken in isolation.  
To see why, suppose that we have an explanation of an emergent property in terms of (i) the 
constituent parts of an emergent entity H, and (ii) the relations that obtain between those parts when they 
are organised into the form of an H. In that case, while we can to give an account of how the property 
arises as a result of the causal interaction between the parts when they are an H, we have done no more 
than explain that emergent property in terms of a system—the parts and their relations—that exists only 
when the emergent entity H exists. Neither ontological nor causal reducibility follow. The reason is that 
the existence of the emergent property depends not only upon the presence of the relevant parts but also 
upon their being organised or arranged in such a way that the particular set of relations characteristic of 
the entity like H obtains between them. If the parts in question were not organised to form an H—if the 
relevant system were not formed—then the causal influence that depends upon the parts being arranged in 
that particular way would not be manifest. It follows, therefore, that the causal power is a sui generis 
property of the relational organisation of the parts when they form an H, not of the individual parts taken 
either in isolation or as an unstructured aggregate (Lawson 2012a: 352). On this view, an emergent entity 
like H consists not only of its constituent parts but also of the structure of relations that obtains between 
them. It is the importance of the relational organisation of the parts for the existence of the emergent 
causal power that precludes ontological and causal reduction and to which the description of those parts 
as forming a system is meant to draw attention. 
10 
 
The ontological and causal reducibility of the emergent entity H implies that it, and more 
specifically its emergent system-level causal powers, cannot be excised or eliminated from causal 
explanations that depend on the exercise of that emergent entity’s causal powers. Any causal explanation 
that depends both upon the properties of the parts and also on how they must be related to form an H is in 
effect an explanation in terms of that emergent entity’s system-level casual powers. For example, while 
we can explain the liquidity of water in terms of its atomic constituents and the relations (chemical bonds) 
obtaining between them when they assume the form of water molecules, the property of liquidity is an 
emergent property that obtains only when the emergent entity, water, is present. The causal power to 
extinguish fires and to slake one’s thirst is a property of water, not of the individual atoms of which it is 
composed. It is a property of the whole and cannot be understood merely through a separate analysis of 
each of the components. It follows, therefore, that causal explanations of how fires can be extinguished or 
thirst quenched have to make reference, if only implicitly, to that emergent entity, because it only when 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms are arranged into the form of water that the relevant causal power is present 
(Elder-Vass 2007b: 415; emphasis added; Elder-Vass 2007a: 30-3; Lawson 2012a: 350-53).  
To bring the discussion back to Hayek’s theory of the mind, recall first of all that—as seen in 
section 3.1 above—Hayek argues that people’s capacity to engage in mental activity arises only when the 
individual nerve fibres are arranged so as to form a structured, hierarchical whole. Those capabilities are, 
therefore, emergent properties; their bearer is the higher-level or emergent entity, namely the human 
mind, that is formed when a set of nerve fibres is arranged into the type of structure that is required to 
facilitate the classification of external stimuli and to respond to those stimuli in the complex, rule-
governed way described by Hayek (Butos and Koppl 2006: 40-43; McQuade 2006: 59; Lewis 2012). On 
this view, while various aspects of human decision-making would not exist in the absence of those 
neurons, and of the electrical impulses that travel along them, consciousness, expectations-formation and 
choice are nevertheless irreducible, both (i) ontologically and (ii) explanatorily, to neural activity. The 
emergent properties are ontologically and causally irreducible to the (properties of) individual nerve 
fibres because they possessed only by a particular whole—namely the hierarchically ordered arrangement 
of neurons found in the human brain—and not by those neurons taken either in isolation or as an 
unstructured aggregate or group (see Hayek [1964] 1967: 26). And the emergent whole—the neurons plus 
the relations that obtain between them—is explanatorily irreducible in the sense that it cannot be 
eliminated without loss of understanding from causal explanations of the generation of the sensory order 
—and other human behaviour—because, if the nerve fibres were not related in such a way that at least 
some stimuli give rise to different followings, then it would be impossible to discriminate between and 
classify different stimuli in the way required to produce distinctive sensory qualities, etc.. On this 
account, therefore, the unique causal powers of human mind—including its capacity to imbue events with 
meaning and to initiate courses of actions in a purposeful fashion, as well as its ability to generate the 
phenomenal world of sense experience—all follow from the fact that the neurons of which it is composed 
would not behave in the ways characteristic of the human mind if they were not constituted into such a 
mind by a particular type of physiological/neural relationships. As Hayek puts it, even if we could 
identify in complete detail the physical mechanisms underpinning some classificatory process, ‘We 
should still have to use the old [mental] categories, though we should be able to explain their formation 
and though we should know the physical “facts” behind them’ (1952: 87). It follows, therefore, that the 
human mind, and associated mental properties such as purposes, beliefs, and so on, cannot be eliminated 
11 
 
from our causal explanations of human behaviour (cf. Elder-Vass 2007b: 415; Searle 1997: 22, 29-32, 
144, 212-13). 
 
3.3 Hayekian psychological foundations for Shackle’s account of choice 
The significance of all this for Shackle is that Hayek’s theoretical psychology can provide an account of 
the working of the mind that does justice to the importance of the (mental) aspects of choice emphasised 
by Shackle, such as genuine choice and purposefulness, without lapsing into the Cartesian dualism—that 
is, the idea that there exists a sharp distinction between the material and mental worlds, with the latter 
consisting of a separate immaterial substance known as ‘the mind’—invoked by Shackle (1979: 3, 21, 
93). Cartesianism’s sharp division between the physical causation found in the material world and the 
intentional causation characteristic of the mental world manifests itself in Shackle’s reluctance to 
countenance any kind of causal antecedent to people’s choices and, in particular, in his notion of choice 
as an ‘uncaused cause’.  
As noted in Section 2.2 above, this mind-body dualism has been criticised for rendering the relation 
between the mental and the physical worlds unintelligible in a number of ways. However, as we shall see, 
it is possible to reformulate Shackle’s account of the mind in such a way as to resolve the problems posed 
by his Cartesianism whilst continuing to do justice to his emphasis on creative choice and the 
imagination. The requisite conceptual resources can be found in Hayek’s theoretical psychology and, 
more specifically, in the emergent causal powers materialism that characterises Hayek’s account of the 
mind (cf. Bunge 2000: 6-9, 21-25; Lawson 1997: 63-64, 175-77; Hodgson 2000: 59-65). As we have 
seen, Hayek’s portrays mental phenomena, not as consisting of distinctive ‘mental stuff’ that exists 
independently of the physical and biological world, but rather as an emergent property of the structured 
array of neurons that is found in the human brain (Hayek 1952: 177-79). So the relationship between the 
mental and physical worlds, so opaque in the Cartesian approach adopted by Shackle, is now 
conceptualised in terms of the notion of emergence. The concept of material causality is retained, but the 
causal interaction between nerve impulses can now be seen to support a set of distinctive higher-level 
(mental) properties such as consciousness, intentionality, and so forth. The higher-level emergent casual 
powers arise out of, and only operate through, the lower-level neuro-physiological processes, so that there 
is not a proliferation of types of causation at any one ontological level, but they are nevertheless—as we 
have seen—irreducible to their lower-level counterparts. 
Consistent with Shackle’s views, therefore, Hayek’s theoretical psychology portrays people as 
subjective beings who, far from responding passively to any given situation, posses the emergent capacity 
actively to interpret the world around them and to imbue the world with meaning. But there is no room 
left for the notion of human choice as an uncaused cause. Rather, people’s choices are grounded in, and 
shaped by, the neural networks found in their brains, without however—as we have seen—being 
ontologically or explanatorily reducible to them. While people possess the emergent causal power to 
make decisions, etc., that capacity is not entirely ungrounded or unrestricted. Rather, it is grounded in, 
and so both facilitated and constrained by, the neural networks in the human brain along with the 
dispositions to which they give rise. Moreover, as we shall discuss in the next section of the paper, 
Hayek’s account is one that suggests that people are creative beings who can respond differently to the 
same set of external circumstances.
4
 
                                                          
4 To put this point slightly differently, Hayek portrays the brain as a decentralised system that has no orchestrating Cartesian self, no central locus 
of control, but which alters its own functioning through its own adaptive, self-regulating activities. On this view, our mental life is a spontaneous 
order, the unintended (emergent) outcome of the rule-governed interactions of a myriad of neurons. There is no directing, over-arching ‘self’, 
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4. OTHER WAYS IN WHICH HAYEKIAN THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY SUPPORTS 
SHACKLE’S APPROACH 
 
In this section, we explore other affinities between Hayek’s model of the mind and Shackle’s account of 
choice, concerning in particular the formation of expectations, creativity, and the notion of ‘practical 
conscience’ (that is, the way in which people’s choices, though creative, are also sensitive to the 
constraints imposed by the nature of the social and material world). 
 
4.1 Mental experimentation before action: map and model 
The connection of neurons that is formed in the human brain constitutes a ‘map’ that reproduces the 
relations between classes of events in the external world, thereby representing the latter. The map is static 
in that, as we have seen, it reflects the kinds of stimuli that have impinged upon a person in the past and—
for reasons that will be described in more detail below—it represents the world in a way the person has 
found useful in the past. At any given moment in time, the map provides a theory of how the world works 
and the interpretive framework by reference to which new stimuli are categorised. Relative to ‘the 
constantly-changing pattern of impulses’, Hayek writes, ‘it can be regarded as semi-permanent’ (1952: 
115). 
Hayek goes on to note, however, that the map does not indicate ‘what particular events will be 
recorded at any given moment’ (1952: 115). Rather, the current interpretation of the world is provided by 
the pattern of impulses that is currently proceeding through the structured arrangement of neurons or map 
in a person’s brain. Those impulses constitute a model of the situation in which the person currently finds 
him- or herself in at least two important ways. First, as we have seen, the impulses give rise to a 
classification of incoming stimuli, thereby generating a representation of the person’s current 
circumstances. Second, and relatedly, that representation is forward-looking in that it draws attention to 
events that have in the past tended to accompany the ones currently being experienced and which 
therefore might accompany them now, so that the person begins to anticipate or expect their occurrence 
on this occasion too (Hayek 1952: 107-18). The map is thus the more dynamic, conjectural counterpart of 
the model.  
We can elaborate on this point by recalling that the (primary) nerve impulse generated by a 
particular external stimulus in turn stimulates neurons connected to those along which that primary 
impulse is first transmitted. In this way, the external stimulus generates an induced pattern of (secondary) 
nerve impulses or associations that are characteristic not only of the external stimulus currently being 
experienced but also of the other potential external stimuli that have typically accompanied it in the past 
(Hayek 1952: 118). This pattern of impulses can therefore be described as a model of the current 
environment because, in addition to classifying the stimulus that is currently being experienced, it also 
draws attention to—and so disposes people to notice—other (potential) stimuli with which the original 
stimulus has been associated in the past (1952: 140). In generating these secondary impulses, the 
individual’s model ‘will thus continually tend to run ahead of the actual situation’, generating heightened 
awareness or expectations of certain possible future stimuli that typically accompanied the ones currently 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
detached from the functioning of the configuration of neurons in the brain, that oversees and directs the operations of the brain. In Hayek’s words, 
‘Our mental activities are not guided by the particulars at which they are consciously directed, or of which the acting mind is aware, but by 
abstract rules which it cannot be said to know yet which nevertheless guide it’ (Hayek [1968] 1978: 39) (also see Dempsey 1996: 25-27, 33). 
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being experienced, even when the latter are not currently present. In Hayek’s words, the model ‘will thus 
function as an apparatus of orientation by representing both the actual state of the environment and the 
changes to be expected in that environment’ (1952: 120, 118). Moreover, given that the events to be 
classified include the person’s own actions, and the consequences thereof, the expectations generated by 
the model include the possible consequences of the person’s own actions. As Hayek puts it, in a passage 
Shackle would surely have relished:  
 
The representation of the existing situation in fact cannot be separated from, and has no 
significance apart from, the representation of the consequences to which it is likely to lead. 
Evan on a pre-conscious level, the organism must live as much in a world of expectation as 
in a world of “fact”, and most responses to a govern stimulus are probably determined only 
via fairly complex processes of “trying out” on the model the effects to be expected from 
alternative courses of action. The reaction to a stimulus thus frequently implies an 
anticipation of the consequences to be expected from it. (1952: 121) 
 
In this way, the model enables a person to ‘try out’ in his or her mind various possible courses of action 
along the line indicated by Shackle, through their possible consequences in a way that enables the person 
the person, fallibly of course, to choose the preferred one (1952: 122-26) (Butos and Koppl 2006: 39-40). 
 Significantly, because the working of the classificatory apparatus that underwrites the process of 
expectations-formation and decision-making depends not just on external circumstances but also on the 
pattern of impulses passing through the nervous system at any moment in time, it will ‘scarcely ever 
respond twice in exactly the same manner to the same external circumstances’. On the contrary, it will 
give rise to ‘entirely new actions’ and behave in a ‘self-adaptive and purposeful way’ (1952: 122-23). In 
other words, as did Shackle, Hayek’s account of the working of the mind and the nature of choice 
suggests that the world must be an open system in the same that in any given external situation (x) a 
person who choose action (y) could equally well have selected a different action (not-y).
5
 
 What we have here is a theoretical-psychological account of the formation of the kind of 
expectations emphasised by Shackle. Just as Shackle argues that people choose between various 
conceptions or images of the future that they themselves have developed through the exercise of their 
creative imaginations, so too can we see in Hayek’s account a portrayal of people as choosing between 
alternative courses of action on the basis of their anticipated consequences and an account of the 
generation of those expectations as involving the creative—but, as we shall see, disciplined—exercise of 
people’s imagination. Moreover, like Shackle, Hayek portrays these expectations as being eminently 
fallible. This reflects the fact that, as Hayek makes clear, the correspondence between the map and the 
real world is only approximate, so that the former represents the latter only ‘in a partial and imperfect 
manner’, providing ‘only a very distorted reproduction of the relationships existing in the world’ (1952: 
145). Consequently, ‘the classification of events provided by that map, and the models to which it gives 
rise at any given moment in time, ‘will often prove to be false, that is, give rise to expectations which are 
not borne out’ (1952: 145; also see Hayek 1973: 102-04, 1976: 130). 
Over time the expectations created by a particular model will be evaluated against the newly 
arriving impulses that record the events actually taking place in the person’s environment. Models, and 
the map or neuronal structure that embodies them, which yield accurate predictions and so help the person 
                                                          
5
 As noted above , on Hayek’s account people have their own sui generis causal powers, including the capacity to make plans and decisions, so 
that their action are not causally reducible to antecedent circumstances. 
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to achieve his/her goals, are strengthened, so their impact on people’s behaviour will grow. In contrast, 
where a model generates expectations that are often disappointed, so that it does little to assist the person 
in achieving his/her goals, then the neuronal connections that underpin that model will be weakened and 
their impact on people’s behaviour will diminish. In this way, via an evolutionary process in which the 
criterion of selection is the accuracy of the expectations to which a model or configuration of neurons 
gives rise, the model and underlying map will be constantly checked against, and revised in accordance 
with, new impulses as they are received by the person.
6
 In particular, the discomfort occasioned by a 
failure to accommodate some new phenomenon within an established pattern provides the stimulus to 
create a new interpretive scheme by a rearrangement of connections, which leads to a redefinition of 
categories. In this way, as we shall elaborate in the next section, experience provides the stimulus to 
experiment with new connections as the mind searches for ways of dealing with recalcitrant stimuli. And, 
as we shall also see, this account of how recalcitrant stimuli prompt the development of new neural 
connections prompted by will be developed into a Hayekian discussion of creativity that will be shown to 
dovetail well with Shackle’s own views on the human imagination.  
 
4.2 Creativity, Language and Metaphor  
It was noted above that, on Hayek’s account, the working of the human mind is relational in the sense that 
the capacity to classify stimuli, and thereby to generate the sensory order, is possessed only by a 
structured arrangement of neurons, not by those neurons taken either in isolation nor as an unstructured 
grouping. For Hayek, it is the structure of the linkages or connections between nerve fibres that governs 
people’s cognitive processes and accounts for the key features of our sensory experiences. One 
implication of Hayek’s account, which will turn out to be important for developing both Hayek and 
Shackle’s accounts of the creativity and the imagination, is its implication that a new phenomenon—a 
new events or object—can only be perceived and understood in terms of its relations of similarity and 
dissimilarity with other, currently better understood events and objects. Something that is completely 
unique, and so cannot be related in any way to something already familiar, cannot even be perceived 
(Hayek 1952: 64, 142-43).
7
  
To see why the relational nature of the operation of the mind is important for understanding 
creativity and the working of the imagination, we need to elaborate briefly on the way in which Hayek 
treats conceptual thinking in The Sensory Order. The key point is that the set of secondary nerve firings 
or followings that provides the basis for the initial classification of an external stimulus, and thereby for 
its being experienced as having a particular kind of sensory quality, is itself an event subject to 
classification. Just as the central nervous system tends to form connections between neural pathways 
activated by external stimuli that are usually experienced concurrently, so too does it form connections 
between sets of secondary nerve fibres that tend to be stimulated together. The secondary followings 
generated by a particular primary impulse will themselves activate neurons connected to those along 
which that secondary following is transmitted. Each set of secondary impulses will therefore generate an 
induced pattern of tertiary nerve impulses, characteristic not only of the sensory quality currently being 
experienced but also of the other sensory qualities that have typically accompanied it in the past. This 
train or wake of tertiary impulses—the following of the initial following, so to speak—provides the basis 
                                                          
6
 The mind, Shackle notes, is ‘an instrument, not an instrument of unchanging conformation and design, but one continually developed and 
modified by the incoming reports and by the endeavour to interpret today’s, this moment’s, report in the light of the Scheme which has grown 
from all earlier reports’ (1979). 
7
 ‘It is only insofar as the nervous system has learnt…to treat a particular stimulus as a member of a certain class of events … that an event can 
be perceived at all’ (Hayek 1952:166). 
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for the classification of the sets of secondary impulses and of the sensory qualities to which they give rise. 
Two followings, and the sensory qualities they cause, are classified as the same only if they stimulate one 
and the same tertiary following. So, for example, if a particular external stimulus is, in virtue of the 
secondary following to which it gives rise, classified as the colour ‘blue’, then the classification of the 
associated secondary following may in turn give rise to the idea that it is a ‘bright’ blue. 
In this way, Hayek argues, in addition to giving rise to the sensory world we experience, the mind 
can develop more abstract or ‘symbolic’ categories that represent qualities shared by certain concrete 
sensory experiences, such as ‘brightness’ (1952: 142-46). One important implication of this picture of 
(re)classification is that connections can be formed between nerve fibres that rarely if ever fire as the 
result of the same external stimulus but which are both stimulated as part of the following of some other 
(secondary) impulse. The formation of those connections that are thereby formed make possible the 
transfer of associations or sensory qualities from one kind of experience to some other experience with 
which that particular quality has never been directly associated, as when colours—as well as sounds or 
temperatures—are described as ‘loud’ or warm respectively. Such transfers—whereby qualities or 
attributes associated with one kind of experience or object are transferred to some other experience or 
object, with which they have not hitherto been associated—are, of course, a hallmark of metaphorical 
thinking. A metaphor is a figure of speech that involves someone speaking or writing about one thing (the 
subject of the metaphor) in terms that are conventionally associated with something else (the so-called 
vehicle of the metaphor). Metaphor is arguably central to creative thought because in attempting to make 
sense of the unconventional use of language involved in a metaphor, listeners or readers must explore 
how (if it all) the terms associated with the vehicle of the metaphor apply to the subject. In doing so, 
readers/listeners are encouraged to view that subject in new ways.  
Consider, for example, a metaphor that is arguably central to Hayek’s own thinking, namely ‘The 
economy is an evolutionary system.’ In describing the economy in this way, one is violating established 
linguistic conventions whereby evolutionary terms are predicated of biological rather than economic 
systems. Faced with such unconventional use of language, it is necessary to attempt to make sense of the 
metaphor by considering whether there really are sufficient similarities between the economy and the 
biological world to warrant thinking about economic life as an open-ended process whose development is 
driven by the differential survival and reproduction rates of the various (social) groups. It is necessary to 
consider, for example, whether there exist in the economic sphere entities (such as interactors and 
replicators) and processes (of variation, selection and replication) analogous to those involved in 
biological evolution. The search for such similarities will heighten people’s awareness of, and so dispose 
them to notice, features of economic life of which they were hitherto unaware, thereby prompting them—
perhaps quite literally—to see the economy in a new way (Lewis [1996] 1999; Lakoff 1993, 2008). In this 
way, the use of metaphorical language encourages people to think of one thing as something else, and to 
explore hitherto unperceived similarities between the two, generating novel (emergent) meanings and 
cognitive content, and thereby enabling people to see, think and talk about objects and situations in a new 
way (Lewis [1996] 1999: 89-90; Lakoff 2008: 21, 32; Fauconnier and Turner 2008: 54-55; cf. Butos and 
Koppl 2006: 40-43). 
In terms of Hayek’s model of the mind, what metaphor involves is the formation of connections 
between hitherto unconnected sets of neurons, one of which has until now been associated with the 
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subject of the metaphor, the other with the vehicle.
8
 The forging of a connection between the two groups 
of neurons implies that sensory qualities and other, more abstract attributes associated with the vehicle 
can now be transferred to, and associated with, the subject of the metaphor, so that the latter is classified, 
viewed and understood in a new ways.
9
 On this view, therefore, a metaphor is not merely a figure of 
speech or a linguistic ornament. Rather, it is the catalyst for, and linguistic manifestation of, a change in a 
person’s underlying conceptual framework, whereby previously unconnected domains of thought—such 
as those pertaining to economic affairs and to evolution—become connected, so that our knowledge of the 
source domain (evolutionary systems, say) is mapped onto the target domain (the economy, in our 
example), thereby altering the way we view and understand the latter (Lakoff 1993, 2008).
10
 
The significance of all this is twofold. First, it enables us to elaborate on and develop the 
descriptions, themselves metaphorical of course, that Shackle himself uses in describing creative human 
choice. As noted in section 2.1 above, Shackle argues that the creativity of human choice derives from 
and reflects the potential of human language to generate and give voice to new thoughts. What we can 
now see is that the generative potential centres on the use of metaphor to develop new perspectives on, 
and insights into, the world.  Arguably, it is something closely akin to the generation of new meanings 
and insight by metaphor that Shackle also has in mind both when he describes new knowledge as being 
‘synthetic in the sense of bringing together ideas formally regarded as independent of each other’ 
(Shackle 1994: 135). For Shackle, linguistic creativity—the scope for people to combine the given set of 
symbols that comprise a language in new ways to express new ideas—is analogous to entrepreneurial 
creativity, in the sense that both involve the development of new combinations of elements (whether they 
be linguistic terms or material goods) to create novel (emergent) meaning. More specifically, one facet of 
entrepreneurship is the creative combination of capital goods so as to form systems that have novel 
emergent properties (as for example when, suitably arranged, the components of an iPhone give rise to the 
emergent capacity to make phone calls, send and receive e-mails, etc) (Harper and Endres 2012; cf. 
Shackle 1979: 24-25, 63).
11
 Second, and relatedly—but less abstractly—it is possible to elaborate on 
various examples documented in the literature on management to illustrate in a specifically economic 
context how metaphor does indeed play a vital role in the injection of novelty into the market process. 
More specifically, the importance of metaphorical language can be illustrated through case studies of 
concrete examples of entrepreneurship that illustrate how the use of metaphorical language was central to 
the creation of new products, in particular by making it possible for workers to make explicit their tacit 
sense of how new products can be designed (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). On this view, the operation of 
the entrepreneurial imagination involves a ‘seeing as’ (seeing one thing as, or in terms of, another), as 
when for example music entrepreneurs began to view turntables not simply as devices for playing 
                                                          
8 Hayek himself appears to acknowledge the importance of metaphor within his account of the working of the mind when he highlights the 
similarities between his account of human creativity and that developed by the Hungarian writer Arthur Koestler (Hayek [1969] 1978: 48-49). 
9
 In Lakoff’s words, ‘conceptual metaphorical mappings … are realised by …brain circuitry’ and, in particular, by ‘neural bindings’ or 
connections that link previously distinct neural structures (2008: 27, 23). 
10
 As Aristotle, the first student of metaphor, put it, ‘a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dis-similars’ (Poetics 
1459a: 7-8).   
11
 In Shackle’s words: ‘Material things will interact according to natural principles when brought together, as tools act on the substance when it is 
fabricated, or as seeds germinate in damp soil. But the applying of one thing to another is a decision of the individual, an act of the origination of 
history. Natural principles are brought into action by choices whose nature we are supposing to be that of beginnings ...  Natural processes and the 
acts of individuals, seen from the standpoint of our chooser, are symbolic or typical entities set in a matrix of his own and others’ choices, set in 
the mortar of these choices and as capable of being assembled into endlessly various forms as bricks are capable of being assembled into 
endlessly various buildings’ (1979: 24, [1972] 1992: 280). In this passage, Shackle hints at the combinatorial elements in entrepreneurial 
creativity, just as he acknowledges the combinatorial element in linguistic creativity. However, in neither case does Shackle have the conceptual 
resources— in particular, the notions of metaphor and of emergence—fully to develop the idea that certain combinations (of words, or of material 
goods, as the case may be) can give rise to novel (emergent) properties.  
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recorded music but as music instruments, upon which music could be played live (Faulkner and Runde 
2009).  
 
4.3 Evolution and practical consequence. 
In this section, the connections between Hayek’s evolutionary conception of the mind and Shackle’s 
notion of ‘practical consequence’ will be discussed, so as to show how Hayek’s theory of the mind can do 
justice not just to the creative aspects of human activity but also to the way in which people’s choices, 
though creative, are also sensitive to the constraints imposed by the nature of the social and material 
world within which they act. Not for nothing does Shackle refer to ‘the Imagined, deemed Possible’ 
(emphasis added). 
On Hayek’s account, people’s expectations, and the pattern of neurons that embodies and gives 
rise to them, are tested by the effectiveness of the actions to which they lead. Neural connections that lead 
to expectations that tend to be confirmed, and thus seem to help the organism to achieve its goals, are 
reinforced, so their impact on people’s behaviour becomes stronger, while neural structures that lead to 
expectations that tend to be disappointed become weaker so that their impact on people’s behaviour 
diminishes. In this way, Hayek provides an account of how, in Shackle’s words, people’s ‘practical 
conscience … broadly forbids self-deception … in the interest of the survival of the chooser’ (p. 11; also 
see p. 15). On a Hayekian account, therefore, the term ‘practical conscience’ refers to the way in which, 
via an evolutionary process of selection, neural structures are reinforced, or whither, according to how 
successful they are in promoting behaviour that is well adapted to the prevailing context—embodied, for 
example, in the prevailing social rules—and which therefore enables a person to achieve his or her 
goals.
12
  
 We can elaborate on this point by considering how Hayekian theoretical psychology provides an 
account of the way in which the structure of people’s mind is shaped by the social-structural context in 
which they find themselves, thereby helping to ensure that people’s decision-making is attuned to the 
constraints imposed by the nature of the society—or the social Field, as Shackle terms it—they inhabit. 
For what the approach developed in The Sensory Order suggests is that repeated action in conformity 
with a social rule can—via social-psychological processes of habituation, imitation, conformism, and so 
forth—cause neurological changes that lead to the formation of new cognitive (neural) structures and, 
therefore, to people having new dispositions to conceptualise and respond to their circumstances in 
certain ways. In this way, social rules can become physically embodied in people, in the sense that 
people’s experience of particular social rules shapes the arrangement of neurons found in their brains. 
Moreover, given that those cognitive structures dispose people both to interpret and perceive certain 
classes of external stimuli as constituting particular types of situation, and also to respond (often without 
conscious deliberation) to those situations by acting in the appropriate, socially sanctioned fashion, it can 
be seen that by moulding those neural networks social rules also shape—without uniquely determining—
people’s perceptions, expectations, and (ultimately) their actions.  
 Consider from the vantage point provided by Hayek’s theory of the mind a simple example, 
namely the way in which new drivers learn the rules of the highway code. Those rules specify the rights 
                                                          
12
 On this view, the mind is a set of rules whose principal function is to guide actions that promote the individual’s successful adaptation to their 
environment. More specifically, Hayek’s account is one in which configurations or structured groups of neurons  can selected (or not, as the case 
may be) in virtue of  their emergent capacity to classify the world in a way that enables the individually to adapt to, and navigate successfully his 
or her environment. On this view, knowledge is an evolutionary adaptation to the external world. The process of neuronal group selection is, of 
course, analogous to the process of group selection that Hayek believes accounts for the development of rule-governed social systems such as the 
market economy (Hayek [1967] 1967). For more on this, see Lewis (2014). 
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and obligations of the drivers who use public roads, thereby setting out how people who are drive cars on 
the public highway must interact with one another. In the case of a novice driver, the appropriate 
behaviour has to be consciously learned, so that the act of following the rules involves impulses travelling 
along nerve fibres in those parts of the brain associated with higher-order, conscious thought. Over time, 
however, as the external stimulus provided, say, by a red light becomes associated with a particular type 
of action—namely, bringing the car to a halt—connections form between the neurons stimulated by that 
external event and the motor fibres that fire when the subsequent response is taken, so that the neurons 
that previously had taken the stimulus into the higher-order nerve centres need not fire for the appropriate 
behavioural response to be forthcoming; the impulses passing through the receptor fibres stimulated by 
the red light cause the motor neurons associated with the act of stopping the car to fire, without the nerve 
fibres leading to the higher centres of the brain coming into play. The upshot is that the appropriate action 
will be taken ‘automatically’, without the involvement of the higher nervous centres, so that the rule will 
no longer be being followed consciously (cf. Hayek 1952b: 23-25, [1967] 1967: 73-74).
13
  
What has happened is that the alteration in the neural structures of the brain—and, more 
specifically, the formation of a set of connections between the nerve fibres that receive and classify a 
particular type of sensory input and the neurons that produce the relevant type of behavioural response—
has led to the formation of a new disposition, namely the disposition to stop at red traffic lights (and to 
expect others to do so), which causes the person in question both to interpret and respond appropriately to 
that aspect of their social environment without having to make a conscious decision to do so on each 
separate occasion, and also to expect others to do likewise (cf. Runde 2002: 22-25; Butos and Koppl 
2006: 40; Elder-Vass 2007c: 334-37). It is just this sort of process of disposition-formation that Hayek 
describes when he writes that: ‘[S]ome learned responses may, after sufficient repetition, become almost 
completely automatic and be effected at low levels [of the neural system]’ (1952: 92):  
 
[T]he formation of abstractions [dispositions] ought to be regarded not as actions of the 
human mind but rather as something which happens to the mind, or that alters the structure 
of relationships which we call the mind, and which consists of the system of abstract rules 
which govern its operation. In other words we ought to regard what we call mind as a system 
of abstract rules of action (each ‘rule’ defining a class of actions) which determines each 
action by a combination of several such rules; while every appearance of a new rule 
constitutes a change in that system, something which its own operations cannot produce but 
which is brought about by extraneous forces. (Hayek [1969] 1978: 43, emphasis added.) 
 
This shaping of people’s dispositions by the context in which they are situated, so they become adapted to 
the social rules that constitute the contours of the (social) Field they inhabit, is precisely what is involved 
in the development of the kind of ‘practical consciousness’ described by Shackle, for it involves people 
becoming attuned to the constraints imposed upon their actions, and the opportunities afforded to them, 
by the (in this case, social) Field in which they live. Thus, the way in which people exercise the creative 
powers of their imagination so as devise the goals they will to pursue is tempered by an awareness of the 
                                                          
13 It is important to add two qualifications here. First, although experienced drivers may follow the rules of the highway code unconsciously, they 
will of course still be able to give an explicit account of why they stopped at a red light if they are called upon to do so. Second, while the 
formation of the new disposition creates a causal tendency for people to stop at red lights, it does not casually determine their actions in the sense 
of compelling them to stop on each and every occasion they see a right light. The reason is simple: the causal impact of the disposition in 
question may be offset by the countervailing causal power of other dispositions. For example, if a person were driving his/her seriously injured 
spouse to hospital, then that person’s propensity to stop at red traffic lights might be overcome by the countervailing force of his/her desire to 
save his/her loved one (Hayek 1952: 23-25, [1969] 1978: 41, 48-49).  
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constraints imposed upon their actions—and the consequences thereof—by the (nature of the) world, so 
that the set of projects from which people choose does indeed become limited to those that are, in 
Shackle’s worlds, ‘deemed Possible’. Hayek’s theoretical psychology thus provides an account of 
cognitive activity that permits just the kind of constrained creativity invoked by Shackle. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
It has been argued above that The Sensory Order provides a theoretical psychological foundation for 
Shackle’s ideas about the mind. Hayek’s account of the working of the mind makes it possible both to 
overcome the problems posed by Shackle’s Cartesianism and also to develop Shackle’s ideas about 
expectations-formation, creativity and practical conscience in fruitful ways. 
A slightly different way of looking at the argument presented above is to think of it as developing 
an answer to the following (transcendental) question: what must the world be like if choice, as Shackle 
understands it, is to be possible? There are two aspects to this question, each of which concerns a different 
part of the world. The first, which is addressed above, concerns what Shackle’s account of choice 
presupposes about the nature of human mind and asks whether it is possible to devise a plausible account 
of the working of the mind that is consistent with, and therefore provides a grounding in theoretical 
psychology for, Shackle’s account of choice. The argument advanced above suggests that Hayek’s 
theoretical psychology does indeed offer one such account. 
The second aspect of an answer to the transcendental question centres on what the external (non-
mental) or social world must be like for creative, originative choice of the kind described by Shackle to be 
possible. It has been argued elsewhere that addressing the second of these two questions indicates that 
Shackle’s account of the nature of the social world also requires development. Briefly, as Shackle himself 
acknowledges, the possibility of creative human choice presupposes that people have some idea about the 
outcomes to which their outcomes might lead. However, according to Shackle, the only possible objects 
of such knowledge are the very same event regularities—regular associations between actions and 
outcomes—whose existence is undermined by creative entrepreneurial choice. So Shackle’s own account 
of the nature of the social world—and, more specifically, of the nature of the social institutions that 
inform and guide people’s choices—arguably undermines his own account of the possibility of creative 
human choice (Runde 1996; Latsis 2015). This is a significant point in the current context because it 
underlines the point, which should not be lost sight of, that for all the compatibility between Shackle’s 
account of choice and Hayek’s theoretical psychology, there remain very important differences between 
them. Hayek in particular develops a much richer account both of the institutional context in which 
people act, and also of how institutions articulate with the human mind and human agency. But that is a 
story for another paper (Fleetwood 1995; Lewis 2012, 2104).  
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